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AN INQUIRY INTO THE UTILITY OF 
"DOMICILE" AS A CONCEPT IN 
CONFLICTS ANALYSIS 
Russell]. Weintraub* 
No attempt is made here to conduct an exhaustive case study 
of any one particular area in which the concept of "domicile" 
is used as a tool for analysis in the conflict of laws. A number of 
thorough and useful studies have been made in narrow areas1 
and are cited at appropriate places in the body of this article. Instead, 
this article will review the use of "domicile" in analyzing certain 
typical conflicts problems, particularly its use as the contact or 
pointing word in choice of law rules concerning the testate and 
intestate distribution of movables, and, as is newly the fashion, its 
use when determining the capacity of a wife to sue her husband in 
tort. "Domicile" as a basis for judicial jurisdiction will also be dealt 
with briefly. But, except for divorce jurisdiction, jurisdiction to 
deal with status will be skirted since such problems are enormously 
complex and require separate treatment. The purpose of this wide-
ranging overview is to appraise the utility of the concept of 
"domicile" as a tool for conflicts analysis. Several well-known cases 
have been selected for examination. A review of those cases and 
the analytical problems they present should allow some conclusions 
to be drawn regarding whether domicile is a useful concept which 
assists proper analysis or is an albatross around our necks that we 
would be better to be quit of. 
I. INTESTATE SUCCESSION TO MOVABLES 
In other areas of choice of law, the second Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws has departed dramatically from the rules of the 
first Restatement. This is true, for example, in the substitution of 
"the state with which the contract has its most significant relation-
ship"2 for "the place of contracting"3 and in the substitution of "the 
• Professor of Law, University of Texas; Visiting Professor of Law, University of 
Michigan.-Ed. 
1. See particularly Stimson, Conflict of Laws and the Administration of Decedents' 
Personal Property, 46 VA. L. REv. 1345 (1960); Yiannopoulos, Wills of Movables in 
American International Conflicts Law-A Critique of the Domiciliary "Rule," 46 
CALIF. L. REv. 185 (1958) (survey of all cases to date of article involving international 
contacts). 
2. REsl'ATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLicr OF LAws § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960). 
3. REsTATEMENT, .CoNFLicr OF LAws § 332 (1934). 
[961] 
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state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence 
and with the parties"4 for "law of the place of wrong."11 These 
changes are already having salutary effects upon our courts.6 
Insofar as intestate succession to movables is concerned, how-
ever, the new Restatement is content to parrot the "law of the state 
of his domicil"7 language of the first Restatement, but with a new 
renvoi twist. The new black-letter rule reads as follows: 
"(l) Questions of intestate succession to interests in chattels or 
in rights embodied in a document are determined by the law 
of the state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his 
death, unless the law of the state in which the chattel or 
document is situated is to the contrary." 
"(2) Questions of intestate succession to rights not embodied 
in a document are determined by the law of the state where 
the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death.''8 
In the case of chattels and rights embodied in a document, 
reference to the whole law of the situs is explained by the fact that 
the situs has control over such movables, 0 the undoubted power to 
administer such assets in the event of intestacy,10 and probably the 
power to apply its own law on distribution should it wish to do 
so.11 This accords with the common explanation of the supposed12 
standard choice of law reference to the law of the domicile at death 
for intestate distribution of personalty as a preliminary reference 
to the whole law of the situs and then a referral by its choice of law 
rule to the law of the domicile at death.13 Moreover, in the new 
4. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLicr OF LAws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). 
5. REsTATEMENT, CONFLicr OF LAws § 379 (1934). 
6. For cases abandoning the "place of wrong" rule under tbe influence of the 
second Restatement, see, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 
N.E.2d 279 (1963); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc,, 416 Pa. I, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). 
7. REsTATEMENT, CONFLicr OF LAws § 303 (1934). 
8. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLicr OF LAws § 303 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959). 
9. Id. § 303, comment b. 
10. See Iowa v. Slimmer, 248 U.S. 115 (1918); Newcomb v. Newcomb, 108 Ky. 582, 
57 S.W. 2 (1900) (power to probate will at situs); Stimson, supra note 1, at 1352. 
11. See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 22 (1891) (dictum); 
Miss. CODE ANN. § 467 (1942) (personal property situated in Mississippi to be dis-
tributed according to Mississippi law); Stimson, supra note 1, at 1380. 
12. Some commentators have found substantial evidence tbat the situs law is being 
applied. See, e.g., Stimson, supra note 1, at 1345, 1380. 
13. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLicr OF LAws 208 (1940); STUMBERG, 
CoNFLicr OF LAws 374 (3d ed. 1963); Briggs, "Renvoi" in the Succession to Tangibles-
A False Issue Based on Faulty Analysis, 64 YALE L.J. 195, 197 (1954); Griswold, Renvoi 
Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1194 (1938). 
Some support for this view is claimed from the fact that esclieat is to the situs. See 
Matter of Menscliefrend's Estate, 283 App. Div. 463, 128 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1954), a[J'd mem., 
8 N.Y.2d 1092, 208 N.Y.S.2d 453, 170 N.E.2d 902, remittitur amended, 8 N.Y.2d 1156, 
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Restatement version, the reference to the law of the domicile, either 
directly or by way of the whole law of the situs, is again to the 
whole law of the domicile including its conflicts rules.14 This is 
to insure that all courts referring to the law of the domicile will 
in fact distribute the property as the courts of the domicile would 
under identical facts.15 
In this age of non-music and non-books, it is probably fitting 
that we should have such a non-rule. A purported choice of law rule 
which refers to the whole law of the indicated jurisdiction is not 
a choice of law rule at all. It gives no real guidance as to which 
domestic law of all those which might be applied is in fact the 
most appropriate. It gives no guidance to the courts of the jurisdic-
tion to whose whole law other courts are directed16-no guidance, 
that is, to the most probable forum. There is a distinction between 
what a forum has the power to do and what it ought to do,17 and 
the purpose of choice of law rules is to tell it what it ought to do in 
selecting applicable law. 
On the whole, however, the expectation of the second Restate-
ment, as of the first, seems to be that the internal law of the domicile 
at death will ultimately be applied to intestate distribution and that 
this is proper.18 Except for the insertion of the renvoi concept and 
the rather sensible recognition of the fact that the meaning of 
"domicile" must vary with the context19 (about which more will 
209 N.Y.S.2d 836, 171 N.E.2d 909, cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. Lefkowitz, 365 U.S. 
842 (1960); In re Barnett's Trusts, [1902] I Ch. 847; REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLicr 
OF LAws § 309 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959). There is, however, some authority to the 
contrary. See Estate of •Nolan, 135 Cal. App. 2d 16, 286 P.2d 899 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955) 
(bank accounts); California v. Tax Comm'n, 55 Wash. 2d 155, 346 P.2d 1006 (1959) 
(stock in local corporation, certificates at domicile); In re Lyons' Estate, 175 Wash. 115, 
26 P.2d 615 (1933) (bank account). There is even some authority that escheat will not 
be to the situs if the law of the domicile treats the domiciliary government as an heir 
for purposes of escheat. See In re Estate of Utassi, 29 Misc. 2d 387, 217 N.Y.S.2d 389 
(Surr. Ct. 1961), afl'd mem., 20 App. Div. 2d 232, 246 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1964); Re Maldonado, 
[1953] 2 All E.R. 1579 (Ct. App.). For criticism of this latter trend, see Ehrenzweig, 
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws-An Unwelcome Addition to American 
Doctrine, in XXrn CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAws 395, 403 (1961). 
14. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLicr OF LAWS § 303, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 
5, 1959). 
15. Ibid. 
16. See COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 264 (1942). 
17. But see Baker, In the Administration of Intangibles-Missouri's Section 466.010 
in Perspective, 19 Mo. L. REv. I, 15 (1954): "Not always have courts clearly distin-
guished between the propriety of administering at the situs, and the propriety of 
applying in that administration the succession law of the domicile." 
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 303, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 
5, 1959). 
19. Id. § 11, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). 
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be said later),20 the approach of the new Restatement to the 
problem is basically the same as that of the old. It might be well 
therefore to scrutinize the "law of the domicile" choice of law rule 
for intestate succession and to begin by reviewing some of the 
classic cases applying that rule. 
A. In re Estate of ]ones21 
I. Facts 
Evan Jones, a native of Wales, had come to America in 1883 
because of bastardy proceedings instituted against him by the 
mother of his illegitimate daughter. He became a naturalized 
citizen and married here, but his wife predeceased him. Being 
thrifty and hard-working, he had accumulated a considerable amount 
of property in Iowa, where he had settled. In 1915, having decided 
to return to his native Wales to live out the rest of his days, he sold 
his realty, purchased a draft for about two thousand dollars, left the 
rest of his cash on deposit in an Iowa bank with a note and mortgage 
for collection, sailed on the Lusitania, and was drowned when that 
ship was sunk by a German submarine. 
The contestants for the intestate property in Iowa were, on one 
side, Evan's brothers and sisters and, on the other, his illegitimate 
daughter. Under Iowa law, because her paternity had been suffi-
ciently proved and recognized during Evan's lifetime,22 the daughter 
would inherit all assets administered in Iowa.23 Under British law, 
however, it was conceded that the intestate distribution would 
be entirely to the decedent's brothers and sisters'. It was therefore 
crucial to decide whether Iowa law or British law controlled the 
intestate distribution. 
2. Decision 
The court took as its guide the choice of law rule that the law 
of the decedent's domicile at death governed the intestate distribu-
tion of his movables. The only issue, then, was whether Evan 
Jones was domiciled in Iowa or in the British Isles at the time of 
his death. The argument for domicile in Great Britain was based 
on the English doctrine of reverter of the domicile of origin as soon 
20. See text accompanying notes 85-96 infra. 
21. 192 Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921). 
22. IOWA CODE ANN. § 3385 (1897). 
23. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 3362, 3378 (1897). 
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as the domicile of choice is abandoned:24 Evan had acquired a 
domicile of choice in Iowa, but as soon as he left Iowa intending 
to return to his domicile of origin, Wales, his domicile of origin was 
renewed. This argument was rejected by the court which viewed 
it as based on feelings of patriotism and ties to the mother country 
that might exist when a British subject went to some distant part 
of the Commonwealth to make his fortune, always regarding himself 
as an Englishman. The court thought such notions inapplicable to 
a naturalized American citizen. Once this doctrine was rejected, 
it was clear that Evan was technically domiciled at death in Iowa. 
He had acquired a domicile of choice in Iowa and would retain it 
until he was physically present in another jurisdiction concurrent 
with a present intention to make the other jurisdiction his home. 
Therefore, he died domiciled in Iowa, Iowa law controlled intestate 
distribution of his property, and all intestate property went to the 
daughter. 
3. Analysis 
In testing the soundness of a decision such as this, it is often 
helpful to put oneself in the position of an advocate for the losing 
side and thus to see what reasonable arguments could be advanced 
for an opposite result. First, the Iowa court misinterpreted the 
English rule on revival of the domicile of origin, since the rule 
was applicable not only when a domicile of choice was abandoned 
to return to the domicile of origin but also whenever a domicile of 
choice was abandoned until a new domicile of choice was estab-
lished. 25 Further, the rule was not based solely on notions of 
patriotism and ties to mother England. The domicile of origin 
reverted because of its special nature; one acquired his domicile 
of origin by operation of law as the domicile of his parents at his 
birth. When, therefore, a person had left his domicile of choice 
intending never to return and it seemed unrealistic to say that he 
retained a domicile there, the domicile of origin which he had 
originally acquired by operation of law would renew, again by opera-
tion of law, until it was once more sensible to speak of a domicile 
of choice elsewhere.26 It seems very unlikely, however, that a 
24. See Udny v. Udny, L.R. 1 H.L. 441 (1869). For a report on a proposal to 
abandon the rule in England, see Graveson, Reform of the Law of Domicile, 70 L.Q. 
R.Ev. 492, 496, 498-99 (1954). 
25. Udny v. Udny, supra note 24, at 448, 454, 460-61. 
26. Id. at 452, 458-60. 
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correct understanding of the English rule on revival of domicile of 
origin would have changed the result. 
Playing the domicile game with the court, one is tempted to 
expose the fallacy latent in the statement that "all will agree that 
the decedent did not have a domicile on the Lusitania."21 For the 
purpose of the choice of law rule in issue, it was necessary only to 
decide whether Evan had died domiciled somewhere in the British 
Isles since Wales has no intestacy law of its own. He could have died 
domiciled in Great Britain without having died domiciled in Wales.28 
As soon as he set foot anyplace on British territory, he would be 
physically present in the jurisdiction whose law was in issue with 
a present intention to make his home somewhere within that 
territory. The Lusitania was a ship of the Cunard Line flying the 
British flag, and in the event of a tort on the high seas, the old, 
standard choice of law rule would have chosen the law of the flag 
to govern.29 Since the Lusitania was a little piece of Britain and 
Evan Jones was therefore on British territory with domiciliary 
intent before he died, he died domiciled in Great Britain, and its 
law, not Iowa law, should have been applied. 
Thus to play the domicile game exposes its inherent silliness. 
Why should the result turn on whether Evan managed to set foot 
on British territory again before his death or whether he retained 
a technical domicile in Iowa? What reasons can be advanced for 
having domicile at death govern the intestate distribution of 
movables and are these reasons applicable in the context of this 
case? Let us turn to these questions, which seem to go to the heart of 
the matter. 
The reason most often advanced in support of the rule that the 
law of the domicile at death governs distribution of movables on 
intestacy (frequently the only reason advanced) is that it insures 
uniformity of distribution.80 It is desirable, in order that confusion 
and conflict may be avoided, that the same law govern distribution 
of movable property everywhere; but this argument does not support 
any particular conflicts rule. Uniform interpretation and application 
of any choice of law rule will produce the desired result. 
27. 192 Iowa 78, 83, 182 N.W. 227, 229 (1921). 
28. REsTATEMENT (SECOND}, CONFLICT OF LA.ws § 11, comment e (Tent. Draft No. 
2, 1954). 
29. REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LA.ws § 406 (1934). 
30. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LA.ws § 303, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 
5, 1959); STUMBERG, op. dt. supra note 13, at 374; Reese, Conflict of Laws and the 
Restatement Second, 28 LAW 8: CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 687 (1963). 
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Another reason frequently given for the domiciliary rule in 
intestacy and stated by the court in the principal case31 is that the 
decedent is presumably more familiar with the law of his domicile 
than that of any other jurisdiction and, having left no will, wishes 
his property to pass in accordance with that domiciliary law. This 
seems unrealistic in the extreme. One may speculate with amuse-
ment over what responses the inquiring reporter would have if he 
asked people whether they knew the intestacy laws of their home 
state and wished those laws to govern distribution of their property. 
But, even conceding the possible validity of this as a general proposi-
tion, was it proper to presume that Evan Jones wished his bastard 
daughter to inherit all of his property? He seems to have made a 
life-long project of avoiding any responsibility for her support, and 
the court itself admitted that, so far as Evan's intentions were 
concerned, there was no basis for choosing Iowa or British law.32 
A reason for applying the domiciliary rule in intestacy cases 
that is far more satisfactory than either of those usually given would 
seem to be that the technical domicile at death is likely, in the great 
majority of cases, to be in fact the jurisdiction which has the sole 
or at least the predominant interest in the application of its intestacy 
laws to the property of the decedent. Whatever be the policies 
underlying a state's intestacy statute directing which of the surviving 
kin shall take and in what portions, the chances are that the technical 
domicile at death will have a real and legitimate interest in wanting 
its own policies in these matters enforced. The natural objects of the 
decedent's bounty, or a good portion of them, are likely to be 
residents of the place of his domicile at death. If hard feelings are 
caused by a distribution improper in the eyes of the domicile, it is 
the domestic peace and tranquility of the domicile which will suffer. 
If those dependent upon the decedent are not given a share the 
domicile state considers just and proper and become objects of public 
charity, the government and citizens of that state will pay the bill. 
If this is the reason which might most reasonably be advanced 
for the rule selecting the law of the domicile at death to govern 
intestate distribution of movables, is it applicable on the facts of 
In re Estate of Jones? A little searching of the record will reveal 
that all of the contestants, the illegitimate daughter and the brothers 
and sisters of the decedent, were residents of the British Isles at the 
time of his death and, with the exception of one sister who had 
31. 192 Iowa at 95, 182 N.W. at 234. 
32. Ibid. 
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sojourned briefly in the United States, had been life-long residents 
of Great Britain.33 Iowa had no interest in preferring the bastard 
daughter over the brothers and sisters when British law would not 
have done so. 
B. White v. Tennant34 
I. Facts 
The same basic objection can be made to the result in White v. 
Tennant. Michael White, at least until less than a month before his 
death, had been a life-long domiciliary of West Virginia, where his 
wife and brothers and sisters were also domiciled. Michael owned a 
farm in West Virginia on which he was living with his wife. He sold 
the farm and reached an agreement with his mother and brothers 
and sisters to occupy a forty-acre tract and a house on that tract. The 
tract was situated in Pennsylvania, just across the state line from 
West Virginia. This forty-acre tract was part of a larger 240-acre 
farm, the main part of which, including the mansion-house, was 
in West Virginia. On the morning of April 2, 1885, Michael and 
his wife left the West Virginia farm and house which he had sold 
and started for the house on the family farm in Pennsylvania "with 
the declared intent and purpose of making the Pennsylvania house 
his home that evening."35 Michael and his wife arrived at the 
Pennsylvania house about sundown. The previous tenants had left 
several days before and the house was damp and uncomfortable. 
Michael's wife complained of feeling ill. Under the circumstances, 
Michael accepted the invitation of his brothers and sisters to spend 
the night in the mansion-house in West Virginia. He paused long 
enough to place in the Pennsylvania house the household goods he 
had carried with him and to tum loose his livestock. As it happened, 
Michael never did return to the Pennsylvania house to live. His 
wife, it was soon learned, had typhoid fever, and he stayed at the 
mansion-house to care for her. For about two weeks he went daily to 
the Pennsylvania tract to care for his stock, then suffered an attack 
33. The residences of the contestants are indicated in the record in the following 
places and are Wales unless otherwise designated. Illegitimate daughter-Margaret, 
appellant's abstract of record, p. 2. Brothers and sisters-William, appellees' amend-
ment to abstract, p. 128; Rees (London), appellant's abstract of record, p. 11; Thomas, 
same abstract, p. 114; Sarah Williams (had lived in United States but returned to 
Wales), same abstract, pp. 114-15; Mary, appellees' amendment to abstract, p. 131; 
John, same abstract, p. 129; Elizabeth Davies, same abstract, p. 130. 
34. 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888). 
35. Id. at 794, 8 S.E. at 598. 
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of typhoid fever himself, and, a short time later, died intestate in 
the West Virginia mansion-house. 
2. Decision 
A good deal depended upon whether "\\Test Virginia law or Penn-
sylvania law was applied to the intestate distribution of Michael's 
personal property. Under West Virginia law everything would go 
to his widow.38 The Pennsylvania statute gave half to the widow 
and half to the brothers and sisters.37 Using the domicile at death 
rule, the West Virginia court ordered distribution under the 
Pennsylvania intestacy statute. It reasoned that Michael had been 
physically present at his house in Pennsylvania with a concurrent 
present intent to make it his home. Though he was present for only 
a short time, even momentary physical presence88 if coupled with the 
requisite domiciliary intention89 would be sufficient. Therefore, he 
had acquired a domicile of choice in Pennsylvania. 
3. Analysis 
Again, if one wishes to play the domiciliary game with the court 
and to argue for application of West Virginia law, it would first be 
necessary to point out the fallacy in one of the arguments the 
court used to establish the existence of a domicile of choice in 
Pennsylvania. The court reasoned40 that Michael had to have a 
domicile somewhere at all times. He did not have one in the house 
he had sold and vacated, and he did not have one in the mansion-
house in West Virginia because he did not think of it as a home. 
Therefore, he must have been domiciled in the Pennsylvania house. 
There is, of course, another possibility. He could have died domi-
ciled in the State of West Virginia, though not in any house in 
that state.41 This is what would necessarily have been the result 
had he suffered a fatal heart attack on the trip to Pennsylvania 
before crossing the state line but after leaving his West Virginia 
!16. w. VA. CODE ch. 78, § 9 (1899). 
!17. Pa. P.L. !115, § I (18!1!1). 
!18. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 15(!1) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). 
!19. Id. § 18: "To acquire a domicile of choice in a place, a person must intend, 
for the time at least, to make that place his home." This is a modem updating of 
the "indefinite time" test traditionally used by American courts and used in the 
principal case. 
40. !11 W. Va. at 797, 8 S.E. at 599-600. 
41. See note 28 supra. 
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house and, let us assume, after it had been occupied by the new 
tenants. Having pointed this out, the argument in support of the 
widow should concentrate on the mental element part of the physical-
presence-plus-domiciliary-intention combination needed to acquire 
a domicile of choice. The argument would be that before he had 
reached Pennsylvania on April 2, in view of his wife's complaints 
of illness, he had already decided to stay in West Virginia at the 
mansion-house that night and thus his domiciliary intention was 
but a future intention and not the required present intention. 
To be sure, the court specifically found that his intention to remain 
was a present one upon his arrival,42 but this finding may have been 
changed by cogent evidence to the contrary. 
Is all this, however, not beside the point? It is a common ploy for 
Conflicts teachers when discussing this case in class to ask whether 
the result would have been the same if the ultimate issue had been 
whether West Virginia or Pennsylvania could levy a large inheritance 
tax on, let us imagine, several million dollars of intangible personalty 
in Michael's estate.43 The purpose of such a question may be to 
prepare the class for the startling revelation that "domicile" may 
mean different things in different contexts. Perhaps, however, there 
is another reason why the result might be different. Such an issue 
would focus the West Virginia court's attention on a matter which 
it did not seem to note in White v. Tennant-West Virginia's 
substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation. In the principal 
case, since all the contestants had been long-time West Virginia 
residents, one can ask what legitimate interest Pennsylvania had in 
controlling the intestate distribution as between the siblings and 
widow of Michael White. In view of the possible policies underlying 
an intestate distribution statute, perhaps Pennsylvania had no inter-
est. Michael certainly was not more familiar with the Pennsylvania 
law on the subject than he was with West Virginia law. West Virginia 
had the predominant, perhaps exclusive, interest in preventing dis-
cord among the contestants and treating them according to its own 
notions of fairness and their needs. Although there is no indication 
of where the widow settled after the death of her husband, presum-
ably it was in West Virginia; but it would be foolish to let much 
42. 31 W. Va. at 796, 8 S.E. at 599. 
43. Cf. Reese, Does Domicil Bear a· Single .Meaning?, 55 CoLUM. L. REv. 589, 593 
(1955) (puts hypothetical similar to White v. Tennant with inheritance tax issue and 
suggests courts would fail to find requisite domiciliary intention toward new state). 
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tum upon that. We would not want the widow to be able to select 
the law to govern distribution by selecting her house.44 
C. A More Useful Tool for Rational Analysis 
In order to point up the relative interests of West Virginia and 
Pennsylvania in the White case and to argue in terms of the policies 
underlying the statutes on intestate distribution, one might approach 
the problem as one of statutory construction. The statutes speak 
of "decedents," "intestates," "widows" and "kindred," but what 
decedents, what intestates, what widows and next of kin? If, as 
one might expect, the statutes of the two states are innocent of 
any answers to these questions in the interstate context of a conflicts 
problem, an answer must be supplied by statutory construction. The 
basic technique of such construction is to inquire into the purposes 
of the statutes to determine which of several possible construc-
tions would advance these purposes and which would not. Unfortu-
nately for such an approach, the Pennsylvania legislature had suc-
cumbed to the domicile dogma and a section of its code read, 
"Nothing in this act contained, relative to a distribution of personal 
estate among kindred, shall be construed to extend to the personal 
estate of an intestate, whose domicile, at the time of his death, was 
out of this commonwealth."46 There was, however, no such embar-
rassment to rational analysis in the West Virginia code for the 
West Virginia forum. A code section such as this serves to buttress 
the argument against attempts to deal with conflict problems by 
statute-at least in the present state of our maturity respecting 
choice of law analysis. If not based upon an analysis of the policies 
underlying the statute and their relevance to extrastate contacts, 
such enactments are likely to generate spurious conflicts, resulting 
in the application of the law of a state having no legitimate interest 
in the matter and defeating the relevant interest of another state. 
If such enactments are based on the analysis of policies and seek to 
advance the interest of the enacting state whenever its policies are 
relevant, they will stifle any attempts at rational solutions to true 
conflicts. 
In view of the possible policies underlying a statutory scheme 
44. But cf. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (widow's 
move from New York after husband's death makes New York law inapplicable). 
45. Pa. P .L. 315, § 20 (1833). 
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of intestate distribution, if we must have a choice of law rule in 
this area as a shorthand for proper analysis, we would do well to 
fashion a judge-made rule which by its very terms takes specific 
account of those policies. Instead of talking in terms of technical 
domicile at death, it would be preferable to speak of "the state with 
the paramount interest in the distribution of the intestate mov-
ables." This may be, perhaps usually will be, the technical domicile 
at death. But, when it is not, we should have the tools at hand to 
recognize this. 
II. VALIDITY OF A WILL DISPOSING OF MOVABLES 
The second Restatement adopts the same formula for determin-
ing the validity of a will of movables as it does for intestate succes-
sion, with the same double renvoi footwork: 
"(l) The validity and effect of a will in so far as it affects 
interests in chattels or in rights embodied in a document are 
determined by the law of the state where the testator was 
domiciled at the time of his death, unless the law of the state 
in which a chattel or document is situated is to the contrary. 
(2) The validity and effect of a will in so far as it affects rights 
not embodied in a document are determined by the law of 
the state where the testator was domiciled at the time of his 
death."46 
Thus is approved for continued use the supposed47 standard 
choice of law rule looking to the domicile of the testator at death. 
Again, we might begin by reviewing a classic case. 
46. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 306 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959). 
47. There is some doubt about the universality of the rule. Alternative references 
are sometimes made, frequently to the situs law, in order to uphold the will. See 
In re Chappell's Estate, 124 Wash, 128, 213 Pac. 684 (1923) (situs law applied to uphold 
testamentary trust as against accumulations rule of domicile); ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 3, 
§ 89b (1961) (nonresident testator may provide in will for application of Illinois law 
as to personalty having situs in Illinois); N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAw § 47 (same); Yianno-
poulos, supra note I, at 206: "Whenever the will does not violate superior policies of 
the forum essential validity is governed by the law upholding the will •.• ,'' (Inter-
national conflicts cases); Note, The Testator's Intention as a Factor in Determining 
the Place of Probate of His Estate, 33 IND, L.J. 591, 599, 608 (1958); cf. Lanius v. 
Fletcher, 100 Tex. 550, 101 S.W. 1076 (1907) (situs law applied to prevent dissolution 
of trust by beneficiary under law of domicile). 
In regard to formal validity, many states have statutes alternatively referring to 
the law of the place of execution or the law of domicile at time of execution. See 
Model Execution of Wills Act, superseding Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, 
9A U.L.A. 341, § 7; RESTATAMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 306, comment f 
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959); Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 905·06 
(1960) (listing thirty-two states with statutes making some alternative reference for 
formal validity). 
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A. An Illustrative Case-In re Annesley48 
I. Facts 
973 
Mrs. Annesley died in France in 1924, having lived there since 
moving from England in 1866. She left two wills, a holographic 
will in French and a will in English form. There was also a codicil 
to the latter. In these wills, Mrs. Annesley purported to dispose of 
all of her personal property in France and in England. This was 
permissible under English law, but, if French law were applicable, 
she could dispose by will of only one-third of her personal property, 
and the rest would go to her two surviving daughters. In a contest 
over distribution of the personal property in England ( consisting 
chiefly of two bank accounts) the daughters, who had received less 
than two-thirds of the property disposed of by the wills, contended 
that French law was applicable; the other legatees argued tor 
English law. 
2. Decision 
The court, applying the domicile-at-death choice of law rule, 
began by deciding that Mrs. Annesley had acquired a domicile of 
choice in France, even though she had not taken the steps prescribed 
for obtaining a formal French domicile40 by Article 13 of the French 
Civil Code and had declared in her English-form will and a codicil 
to it that it was not her intention to abandon her English domicile 
of origin. For purposes of the English choice of law rule, "domicile" 
would be defined by English standards.r;o Immediately, however, 
the English court ran into another difficulty. The English choice 
of law rule would refer to French law in this case, but what French 
law-French domestic internal law only or the whole law of France 
including its conflicts rules? This was important because, in the 
case of a foreigner not legally domiciled in France according to the 
French Code, the French choice of law rule would select the law of 
that person's nationality-here, British law. Speaking for the major-
ity of the court, Judge Russell applied the whole law of France, 
although he himself would have preferred the other alternative.151 
48. [1926] Ch. 692. 
49. But see DELAUME, AMERICAN-FRENCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LA.w 74-75 (2d ed. 
1961) ("an alien residing in France with the appropriate intent could acquire a 
de facto domicile in France, a notion substantially equivalent to the general concept 
of domicile'1· 
50. [1926] Ch. at 705. 
51. Id. at 708-09. 
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The method chosen for applying the whole law of France was 
for the English court to decide the case just as a French court 
would have. After hearing expert testimony on this subject, the court 
decided that a French court would refer to English law, including 
the English choice of law rule pointing back to France, would accept 
this reference .back (renvoi), and would apply French internal law 
to determine the validity of the testamentary disposition.52 Thus 
Mrs. Annesley's wills were invalid insofar as they undertook to 
dispose of more than one-third of her personalty, and the legacies 
of the personalty in England under the will in English form could 
not be paid in full. 
3. Analysis 
This is all wonderfully complex and interesting. The only 
difficulty is that it makes no sense whatever and the result is wrong. 53 
The intent of the testatrix was known; it was, as expressed in her 
wills, to leave the bulk of her estate to persons and institutions 
other than her two daughters. England had no policy against giving 
effect to this intention, and English law permitted testamentary 
disposition of an entire estate. Did France have any logically ap-
plicable policy against giving effect to this intent? There was such 
a French policy in regard to persons "domiciled" in France in the 
French sense. But is not the French choice of law rule an indication 
that the French policy, as interpreted by the French courts, is 
inapplicable to this very testatrix? Why should an English court 
enforce a French limitation on the intent of the testatrix when the 
French courts themselves would not have enforced it but for the 
English reference to French law?54 It is gauche to be more Roman 
52. Cf. In re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652, adhered to, 100 
N.Y.S.2d 371 (Surr. Ct. 1950) (applying whole law of situs to determine validity of 
devise of realty); In re Zietz's Estate, 198 Misc. 77, 96 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Surr. Ct. 1950) 
(situs accepts reference by law of domicile to law of nationality); Simmons v. Simmons, 
17 N.S.W. St. 419 (1917) (reference to whole law of domicile in intestacy with opposite 
view of that taken in principal case as to French rule on renvoi). For the very ques• 
tionable use of the renvoi device to resolve a question of will construction, see In re 
Duke of Wellington, [1947] Ch. 506. This case is aptly criticized in Mann, Succession 
to Immovables Abroad, 11 MODERN L. REv. 232 (1948). For a case rejecting reference 
to the whole foreign law but reaching a result which should have been reached by 
construction alone, see Matter of Tallmadge, 109 Misc. 696, 181 N.Y.S. 336 (Surr. Ct. 
1919). 
53. For a case fortuitously reaching the right result by the same device because the 
Italian conflicts rule referred back to only the internal law of the "nationality," 
which the court took to mean the last but no longer continuing American domicile, 
see Taormina v. Taormina Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 17, 109 A.2d 400 (1954). 
54. Counsel for the parties entitled to a trust legacy made a similar argument in 
the principal case. "The origin of the rule that the law of the domicil governs the 
succession to movables is based on convenience and international courtesy. The rule 
is satisfied as soon as it is found that the law of the domicil rejects the propositus, 
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than the Romans, but to be more French than the French is down-
right sinful. 
The reason the English court fell into error was that, in adopting 
the renvoi device and placing itself in the position of a French 
court, it assumed that achieving uniformity of decision and thus 
insulating the result from change by the selection of a forum was 
the sole goal of choice of law rules. This is a goal, but only a 
secondary or subsidiary one. The primary goal is to apply the law 
which best takes into account the interests of the contact states and 
the intentions of the parties. As a first step in conflicts analysis, the 
court should determine whether there is any real conflict represented 
by the differing domestic laws-whether the contact states have 
applicable policies pointing to different results. If there is such a 
real conflict, the court should attempt to provide a rational solution, 
perhaps by looking to shared policies and general, shared trends in 
the underlying substantive area. It is only when this primary analysis 
is exhausted without success by a non-neutral forum55-when there 
is a real conflict which does not lend itself to rational solution or 
when neither state has an interest in having its law applied but one 
or the other must be applied56-that the sole focus is properly on 
insulating the result from the selection of the forum. When this is 
the proper focus, the "sitting-and-judging" formula with the forum 
court placing itself in the position of the foreign court and deciding 
the case exactly as the foreign court would have is the place to be-
gin. This technique will not wor~ if the foreign court would also 
employ it, since an endless circle of references will result unless 
there is some natural terminus on which both jurisdictions can 
agree, such as "the more probable forum."r.7 It also will not work 
if there is more than one foreign contact state and the courts in 
those states would reach results diverse from one another and 
diverse from the forum. Only at this point-when rational solution 
of the conflict in terms of substantive policies and procedural 
and then both on grounds of convenience and courtesy an English court will apply 
English law." (1926] Ch. at 700. 
55. If the forum has no applicable policy of its own and justice to the parties 
does not permit dismissal under a doctrine of forum non conveniens, the neutral 
forum should probably mirror a result that would be reached in common by all 
interested states. See Cheatham &: Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 959, 969 (1952). 
56. See Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems, 21 U. PITl'. L. REv'. 
573, 589 (1960). But see Currie, Survival of Actions-Adjudication Versus Automation 
in the Conflict of Laws, lO STAN. L. REv. 205, 228-29 (1958). 
57. Cf. Freund, Characterization With Respect to Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 
in THE CONFLicr OF LAws AND INTERNATIONAL CoNTRACTS 158, 161 (1951). 
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attempts to insulate the result from the selection of the forum have 
both failed-has the time come to apply the rationally applicable 
law most convenient for and most in consonance with the domestic 
policies of the forum. Except in the case of a neutral forum without 
sufficient contacts with the parties or with the transaction to keep 
application of its law within the bounds of reason, 118 this will be the 
forum law. 
B. A More Useful Approach 
A conflicts case involving the essential validity of a will presents 
a problem too complex to be solved by any rigid, territorially 
oriented choice of law rule in the standard mold. This is true 
whether we use "domicile" or "situs" or any other jurisdiction-
selector as the contact word. The number of different rules under 
which a will might be declared invalid is very great, and the policies 
which underlie these rules are quite diverse. In such a situation, 
when one state having a contact with the parties or the property 
would invalidate a will and another with such a contact would 
uphold it, the way to begin is by focusing on the domestic laws in 
apparent conflict and on the policies underlying those laws.110 In 
light of those policies and those contacts, does only one of the 
states have a rational interest in having its policies and its law 
applied? If so, there is no true conflict and the law of that state 
should be applied. If, on the other hand, several states have legiti-
mate concerns for having their diverse rules on validity applied, 
a real conflict is present and a rational solution for it should be 
sought. Perhaps the general direction for resolution of a true con-
flict concerning the essential validity of a will should be toward 
validation.60 It is likely, at least as between states of the United 
States, that the difference in the laws will be one of detail rather 
than basic policy; for example, one state may have a "two lives" 
perpetuities rule and another a "lives in being" rule. The states 
will share a general policy of upholding the intention of the 
testator, an invalidating rule being an exception carved out of this 
general policy. 61 If, however, the difference in laws is basic and 
58. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a 
State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L. REv. 449, 450-68, 490 (1959). 
59. See STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 377: "The problem is primarily one 
of ascertaining the policy or purpose behind a particular prohibition and then giving 
it effect." 
60. Cf. Yiannopoulos, Wills of Movables in American International Conflicts Law 
-A Critique of the Domiciliary "Rule," 46 CALIF. L. REv. 185, 206, 262 (1958). 
61. Cf. Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement of Conflict 
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the equities for validation are weak, perhaps both states would 
agree that invalidation is the proper resolution of the conflict. 
A further illustration may be helpful. Let us suppose a case 
in which a testator, who was a long-term resident of state X, as 
were all the natural objects of his bounty, dies in X bequeathing 
personalty located in state Y to a Y charity, which conducts its 
activities only in Y. I£ all contacts had been in Y the will would 
have failed, at least in part, because the will was executed closer 
to the time of death than is permitted by Y law for bequests to 
charities. If all contacts had been in X, the bequest would have 
failed because it gave the charity property in a greater amount 
than charities are permitted to take under X law. 
On the surface, there appears to be no real conflict, except 
perhaps as to the degree of invalidity, and it appears that the bequest 
should fail. But appearances may be deceiving. Let us assume, 62 for 
the purposes of illustrative analysis, that the only policy under-
lying the Y time limit on bequests to charities is the protection of 
the decedent and next of kin from death-bed decisions prompted 
by solicitations or late-coming religious fervor. Let us similarly 
suppose that the only purpose of the X statute is to prevent local 
charities from becoming too powerful and to protect the local 
economy by limiting the amount of property that can be taken out 
of commercial use. 63 If so, then on these facts X has no interest in 
applying its invalidating rule and neither has Y. Both X and Y have 
a general policy of giving effect to the intention of the testator, and 
this general policy should be effectuated in the posited case no 
matter which state is the forum. 
III. CAPACITY OF A WIFE To SuE HER HusBAND 
FOR NEGLIGENCE 
A. Illustrative Cases 
I. Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co.6~ 
This case produced the rule that a wife's capacity to sue her hus-
band for negligence is determined by the law of the marital domi-
of Laws-A Critique, 46 IowA L. REY. 71!1, 714-16 (1961) (resolution of true conflict 
concerning validity of contract). 
62. A limit on the amount charities can take will, to some extent, protect heirs, 
and protection of heirs will, to some extent, limit the amount taken by charities. 
6!1. For an early non-conflicts case pointing out the differences in types and 
policies of such statutes, see Trustees of Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N.Y. 282, 45 
N.E. 876 (1897). For a masterly treatment of the problem, see Hancock, In the Parish 
of St. Mary le Bow, in the Ward of Cheap, 16 STAN. L. REv. 561 (1964). 
64. 7 Wis. 2d 1!10, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). 
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cile. While a husband and wife, domiciled in Wisconsin, were driv-
ing in California, the wife was injured by the husband's negligence. 
Under Wisconsin law, but not under California law at that time, 
a wife could sue her husband for such negligent injury. Overruling 
a long line of Wisconsin cases65 and abandoning the "place of 
wrong" rule in this context, the Wisconsin court permitted the wife 
to sue her husband and his liability insurer. The reason given was 
that this was a problem of family law and not tort law and therefore 
was governed by the law of the marital domicile rather than that 
of the place of ·wrong. 
This kind of label-switching, not based on analysis of the policies 
underlying the apparently conflicting state law, is arbitrary and un-
convincing. Furthermore, devoid as it is of proper analysis of sub-
stantive policies, it runs the risk of creating as many spurious 
conflicts as did the rule it replaced. In Haumschild the result, for-
tuitously, happened to be correct. It was correct because Wisconsin 
had an obvious interest in permitting the wife to recover and 
California's rule preventing suit applied only to California husbands 
and wives. The reason for the California rule was that, since Cali-
fornia is a community property state, the defendant husband would 
share in the fruits of his wrongdoing if the wife recovered. The dis-
ability of California wives to sue their husbands for negligence was 
terminated as soon as the community property law was amended so 
that the husband would not share in the recovery.66 
2. Haynie v. Hanson67 
In another Wisconsin case applying the domicile rule, however, 
a spurious conflict was generated and the result was wrong. In 
Haynie an Illinois husband and wife were driving in Wisconsin 
when the wife, Mrs. Haynie, was injured in a collision with an auto-
mobile driven by Mr. Hanson. The wife sued Mr. Hanson and his 
liability insurer in Wisconsin. At all relevant times, Mr. Hanson 
was a citizen of Wisconsin and his liability insurer was a Wisconsin 
company.68 The defendants attempted to implead the Illinois hus-
65. E.g., Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931). 
66. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70 (1962). For a case reaching the 
Haumschild result, but on the basis of policies underlying the competing rules, see 
Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963). In California, a wife's 
cause of action even before Klein was not community property if it arose in California 
between spouses domiciled in noncommunity property states. Bruton v. Villoria, 138 
Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956). 
67. 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962). 
68. Brief for Appellant, p. l 1. 
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band's liability insurer on the ground that the husband's negligence 
made him liable for contribution. The cross-complaint was dismissed 
on the ground that under Illinois law a wife could not sue her hus-
band for negligence and, applying the Haumschild marital domicile 
choice of law rule, there was no underlying liability on which to 
base contribution. This is wrong. Wisconsin had an interest in per-
mitting the Wisconsin defendants to obtain contribution and had no 
policy against wives suing husbands. The policies possibly under-
lying the Illinois incapacity rule-prevention of marital discord and 
fear of collusive suits-were not rationally applicable when the wife 
was suing not her husband, but third parties, in a Wisconsin forum.69 
B. The Harm of the Domicile Concept in this Context 
Aside from generating false conflicts in the contribution situa-
tion, the domicile-centered rule for determining the wife's capacity 
to sue may disguise a real conflict and prevent its rational solution. 
Even if a suit against the husband is forbidden by the law of the 
domicile, another state may have a very significant interest in per-
mitting recovery. This would be true, for example, if the accident 
happened in a state which permitted such suits, the wife was seri-
ously injured and under intensive treatment there, there were un-
paid medical creditors, and the wife was a public charge. Under 
such circumstances, if suit is brought at the place of injury and the 
main concern of the domicile is the prevention of collusive suits, 
perhaps the conflict should be resolved in favor of permitting re-
covery. 
Thus, once again, a domicile-centered choice of law rule gener-
ates false problems and interferes with the rational solution of true 
problems.70 
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR JUDICIAL JURISDICTION 
Domicile within a state is a recognized constitutional basis for 
in personam jurisdiction, 71 provided notice and opportunity to be 
heard that are reasonable under the circumstances are given.72 But 
69. Cf. Lachance v. Service Trucking Co., 215 F. Supp. 162 (D. Md. 1963) (permits 
joinder of husband on analysis similar to that above; but query whether the place of 
impact had interest in permitting contribution except as place where defendant com-
pany transacted some business). 
70. For a fuller discussion, see Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems 
-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215, 216-20 (1963). 
71. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
72. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917). 
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is mere technical domicile within a state always sufficient for this 
purpose? 
A Illustrative Cases 
I. Alvord &- Alvord v. Patenotre18 
In this case substituted service based on the defendant's domi-
cile within the state was made five days after the defendant had left 
the state intending to establish a domicile of choice in Switzerland. 
At the time of service, defendant had not yet arrived in Switzerland; 
so, lacking the necessary physical presence, he had not yet established 
his domicile there. This being so, under the technical concept of 
domicile, he retained his former domicile in New York, and a 
motion to vacate the order for substituted service was denied. 
The core concept in satisfying the due process demands for 
judicial jurisdiction is one of reasonableness. In the great majority 
of cases, domicile within a state is likely to provide a constitutional 
basis for in personam jurisdiction because it is reasonable to require 
domiciliaries who are temporarily absent from the state to appear 
and defend under penalty of having their rights adjudicated by de-
fault. In the Patenotre case, the passage of only five days and the 
fact that during that time the defendant would not likely be subject 
to suit anywhere else may have made the result reasonable. But sup-
pose we extend the period of defendant's sojourn to his new domi-
cile to a year or more, during which time he was undecided where to 
make his new home. AU his property has been removed from his 
former home state and he has severed all other connections with it. 
Assuming no other basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 
is his technical domicile there enough to answer due process objec-
tions to an attempt to assert such jurisdiction over him? One would 
hope not.74 
73. 196 Misc. 524, 92 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1949). 
74. But see REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLicr OF LAws, Explanatory note § 79. at 70 
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956): "The position is taken in this Section that domicil in a 
state provides a sufficient basis of judicial jurisdiction even though the individual's 
contacts with the state are slight and his domicil there of a technical nature. This is 
because (1) everyone should be subject to suit in at least one state without actually 
being present there at the time of service and (2) a person will normally be more 
closely connected with the state of his domicil than with any other." As support for 
this statement there is cited the following passage from McDonald v. Mabee, 248 
U.S. 90, 92 (1917): "When the former suit was begun, Mabee, although technically 
domiciled in Texas, had left the state, intending to establish his home elsewhere. 
Perhaps in view of his technical position and the actual presence of his family in 
the state, a summons left at his last and usual place of abode would have been 
enough." (Emphasis added.) If this passage supports anything, it would seem to sup-
port a position contrary to that taken by the second Restatement. 
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2. Lea v. Lea75 
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This case presents another example of how losing sight of the 
core concept of reasonableness and focusing on technical domicile 
may hinder rational analysis in matters of judicial jurisdiction. A 
woman domiciled in New Jersey was attempting to enforce an ali-
mony award which had been included in a divorce decree obtained 
against her former husband in New York. The former husband, 
also presently domiciled in New Jersey, contended that the alimony 
award was void because the New York court did not have in per-
sonam jurisdiction over him. The New York court had based its juris-
diction on the husband's domicile in New York, although in fact, 
at the time of the wife's divorce in New York, the husband was 
living in Louisiana with another woman. He had been living and 
working in Louisiana for several years and had clearly established 
a domicile of choice there when he moved into that state with his 
wife and son. He had, however, sent his wife and son from Louisi-
ana to New York to be with his mother who was dying. The hus-
band came to New York for his mother's funeral but returned to 
Louisiana, leaving his wife and child in New York. Suspicious of 
her husband's continued insistence that she stay in New York, the 
wife went to Louisiana, learned that her. husband had secured a 
purported divorce in Arkansas, and then returned to New York to 
file suit for divorce. The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the 
New York alimony decree based on the husband's domicile in New 
York, saying: "Even conceding that the appellant has never been 
in the State of New York, except to pass through, since 1942, he 
was under a paramount duty to supply a home for his wife and 
child and such a home was established at his direction, insecure as 
it was, in New York. We, therefore, conclude that the family domi-
cile and the domicile of the appellant was in the State of New 
York .•• .''78 
New York probably had a constitutional basis for personal juris-
diction over the absent husband, since he had sent his wife and 
child into the state and they were there with a right to his support. 
He caused these consequences in New York and should be subject 
to the jurisdiction of a New York court in an action growing out 
75. 18 N.J. 1, 112 A.2d 540 (1955). 
76. Id. at 11, 112 A.2d at 545. Cf. Bangs v. Inhabitants of Brewster, Ill Mass. 882 
(187!1) (domicile of choice established by wife's presence while husband at sea). But cf. 
Mdntosh v. Maricopa County, 78 Ariz. !166,,241 P.2d 801 (1952) (wife's presence while 
husband in armed forces did not establish husband's domicile of choice). 
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of them. 77 Having a constitutional basis for jurisdiction, absent 
any outrageous surprise to the husband, the New York courts were 
probably free to stretch their domiciliary service statute to cover the 
situation as other courts have stretched "doing business" statutes.78 
But we should not be so caught up in this play acting that we believe 
for a moment that the husband was "domiciled" in New York and 
that this was the basis for jurisdiction. 
To test this proposition, suppose one of the husband's Louisiana 
creditors had moved to New York and then discovered that he had 
forgotten to collect a sum the husband owed him. Having learned of 
the wife's action in New York and the finding of domicile by the 
New York court, the creditor sues the husband in New York using 
the provision for substituted service on domiciliaries. It is sub-
mitted that there is no constitutional basis for in personam juris-
diction over the husband in the creditor's suit.79 
B. A Substitute for Domicile as a Basis for 
Judicial Jurisdiction 
Just as technical domicile alone should not suffice as a constitu-
tional basis for personal jurisdiction when measured against the 
core concept of reasonableness, it would seem that in view of this 
same reasonableness standard, technical domicile, despite United 
States Supreme Court dicta to the contrary,80 should not be a con-
stitutional prerequisite for divorce jurisdiction.81 What is necessary 
for divorce jurisdiction is some contact between the forum and the 
marriage to give that forum a reasonable interest in affecting the 
marital status. The servicemen's divorce statutes and the opinions 
upholding their validity seem proper by such a test.82 The service-
man's substantial period of residence in the state while stationed 
77. See R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFUCT OF LAWS § 84 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956). 
78. See Roy v. North Am. Alliance, Inc., 205 A.2d 844 (N.H. 1964); Note, Recent 
Interpretations of "Doing Business" Statutes, 44 IowA L. REv. 345 (1959). 
79. Cf. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFUCT OF LAws 199 (1942) 
(although the court in Winans v. Winans, 205 Mass. 388, 91 N.E. 394 (1910), found 
husband domiciled in Massachusetts for purpose of wife's divorce jurisdiction, Cook 
does not think there would be a similar finding for personal jurisdiction in a cause 
of action not related to the marriage). 
80. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945): "Under our 
system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is 
founded on domicil." 
81. See Note, Domidle as a Constitutional Requirement for Divorce Jurisdiction, 44 
IOWA L. R.Ev. 765 (1959). 
82. See, e.g., Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1964); Craig v. Craig, 
143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936); Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959). 
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there, which the statutes require, 83 seems to afford the state where 
he is serving a legitimate interest in affecting his marital status al-
though, because of his obligation to obey orders and the nomadic 
nature of service life, he could not ordinarily have the state of 
mind required to establish a technical domicile of choice in that 
state.8¼ 
V. THE SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD RETAIN "DOMICILE" 
AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICTS ANALYSIS BUT RECOGNIZE 
THAT ITS MEANING CHANGES WITH THE CONTEXT 
In the famous debate during the proceedings of the American 
Law Institute concerning the adoption of the provisions of the first 
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws on domicile, Professor Walter 
Wheeler Cook advanced the following proposition concerning the 
meaning of that term: "There is no doubt that what you might call 
the core of the concept is the same in all these situations; but as you 
get out towards what I like to call the twilight zone of the subject, 
I don't believe the scope remains exactly the same for all pur-
83. An exception is the Alabama statute which requires no period of residence. 
Au. CODE tit. 7, § 96(1) (1958): "Any person in any branch or service of the govern-
ment of the United States of America, including those in the military, air and 
naval service, and the husband or wife of any such person, if he or she be living 
within the borders of the State of Alabama shall be deemed to be a resident of the 
State of Alabama for the purpose of maintaining any suit or action at law or in 
equity in the courts of this State." Furthermore, the Alabama divorce statute requires 
a period of residence (one year) only if the divorce is ex parte and only if the 
defendant is not a resident. ALA. CoDE tit. 34, § 29 (1958). The validity of the Alabama 
servicemen's residence statute would, therefore, seem highly doubtful in divorce cases. 
It was, however, upheld in a case in which the plaintiff serviceman had actually lived 
in Alabama for almost two years. Conrad v. Conrad, 275 Ala. 202, 153 So. 2d 635 (1963). 
84. See, e.g., Hammerstein v. Hammerstein, 269 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). 
But see Slade v. Slade, 122 N.W.2d 160 (N.D. 1963); Sasse v. Sasse, 41 Wash. 2d 363, 
249 P.2d 380 (1952). 
The second Restatement draws a distinction between soldiers who must live on 
post and those who may live off post. REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 21, 
comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954): "A soldier or sailor, if he is ordered to a 
station to which he must go and live in quarters assigned to him, cannot acquire a 
domicil there though he lives in the assigned quarters with his family • • . . On the 
other hand, if he is allowed to live with his family where he pleases provided it is 
near enough to his post to enable him to perform his duty, he retains some power 
of choice over the place of his abode and can acquire a domicil." Query whether 
an irrebuttable presumption that a serviceman living on post cannot acquire a 
domicile of choice in the state is a sufficiently reasonable classification to withstand 
attack under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Cf. Carrington 
v. Rash, 85 Sup. Ct. 775 (1965) (Texas constitutional provision preventing servicemen 
from acquiring a voting residence in Texas a violation of equal protection); Newman 
v. Graham, 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960) (Idaho Board of Education regulation 
preventing nonresident students from acquiring resident status for purposes of tuition 
is arbitrary and unreasonable). 
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poses."85 This was too much for Professor Beale, the Reporter, and 
his vested rights allies to swallow, since it would upset the symmetry 
of the tight little syllogisms that they were fashioning and that im-
prisoned conflicts analysis for the better part of three decades. At 
least for now, however, the verdict of history has gone to Professor 
Cook, for the second Restatement adopts substantially his position.86 
It, of course, cannot be otherwise. The domiciliary concept is 
used for too many diverse purposes; the finding of domicile is too 
dependent upon subjective inferences drawn from the facts, even un-
disputed facts, 87 for the meaning of that concept not to vary with 
its context.88 For this same reason, the proposition that the meaning 
of "domicile" shifts with the circumstances would be difficult or 
impossible to prove by case analysis. Articulating the same technical 
definition of "domicile," courts can shift its meaning subtly by 
shifting the emphasis to one or another element of the definition or 
by drawing different reasonable inferences from essentially the same 
fact pattern.89 
The point, however, is that the common-sense recognition that 
the meaning of "domicile" must shift with the use to which it is 
put, is not enough to preserve it as a viable and useful tool for 
conflicts analysis, especially as a contact word in choice of law rules. 
It is true that an able and enlightened court, utilizing the flexibility 
inherent in the term, can reach proper results in individual cases. 
This is not impossible, but neither is it very easy or likely. It is 
like retaining "place of wrong" as the basic choice of law rule for 
torts and attempting to achieve just and rational results by varying 
85. 3 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN !..AW INSTITUTE 227 (1925). 
86. REsrATEMENT {SECOND), CONFUCT OF LAws § 11, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 
2, 1954). 
87. The classic example is the Dorrance litigation in which, from essentially undis• 
puted facts, Mr. Dorrance was found domiciled in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
at death and double inheritance taxes were levied. In re Dorrance, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 
170 Atl. 601 (Prerogative Ct. 1934), aff'd mem., 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 Atl. 902 (Sup. 
Ct. 1935), afj'd mem., II6 N.JL. 362, 184 Atl. 743, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936); 
Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 617 (1932). 
88. See STOMBERG, CoNFUCT OF I..Aws 48 (3d ed. 1963); Reese, supra note 43, at 592; 
Yiannopoulos, supra note 60, at 259 n.378. For a classic judicial statement of the 
opposing viewpoint, see Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914) (Holmes, J.): 
"The very meaning of domicil is the technically preeminent headquarters that every 
person is compelled to have in order that certain rights and duties that have been 
attached to it by the law may be determined •••• In its nature it is one, and if in 
any case two are recognized for different purposes it is a doubtful anomaly." 
89. Cf. REsrATEMENT {SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 21, comment d (Tent. Draft 
No. 2, 1954). 
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the meaning of "place of wrong"90 or by characterization legerde-
main. 01 
One of the crowning glories of the new Restatement is that it 
has abandoned the "place of ·wrong" rule for torts.92 There is no 
justification for retaining any rigid, territorially-oriented choice of 
law rule which utilizes contact words pointing to a place rather 
than focusing attention on the reasonable interests of contact states.93 
If the result in In re Estate of ]ones94 is wrong, the error does not 
lie in fixing Evan Jones' technical domicile at death in Iowa. It is 
wrong because Great Britain had an interest in controlling the dis-
tribution of Evan's intestate personalty as between his illegitimate 
daughter and his brothers and sisters; Iowa did not. If the result 
in White v. Tennant05 is wrong, it is wrong because it fails to ad-
vance West Virginia's legitimate interests in having its own law 
applied, not because Michael White was domiciled at death in West 
Virginia. So, too, if the holding in In re Annesley96 is incorrect, it is 
because it employs the French rule frustrating the intention of the 
testatrix when the French rule is not relevant. 
If it is desirable in these cases to manipulate the meaning of 
"domicile" so that Evan Jones will be domiciled at death in Great 
Britain, or Michael White in West Virginia, or Mrs. Annesley in 
England, it is because of reasons revealed by an analysis of the 
policies underlying the apparently conflicting domestic rules con-
90. Cases involving harm to the incidents of marriage have sometimes applied the 
law of the marital domicile rather than the law of the place where the defendant 
acts. Albert v. McGrath, 278 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (alienation of affections); Orr 
v. Sasseman, 239 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1956) (alienation of affections); Gordon v. Parker, 
83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass), afj'd, 178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949) (alienation of affections). 
For cases rejecting the argument that the harm occurred at the marital domicile, see 
Sestito v. Knop, 297 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1961) (loss of consortium); Jordan v. States 
Marine Corp., 257 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1958) (loss of consortium); McVickers v. Chesa-
peake &: O. Ry., 194 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich. 1961) (loss of consortium). But cf. 
Lister v. McAnulty, [1944] Can. Sup. Ct. 317, [1944] 3 D.L.R. 673 (law of marital 
domicile applied to prevent husband's recovery for loss of consortium). 
91. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 
172 N.E.2d 526 (1961) ("procedural''); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 
130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) ("family law''); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 
944 (1953) ("administration of estates," "procedural''). 
92. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LA.ws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). 
93. As an indication that allowing the meaning of domicile to vary with context 
will not produce satisfactory results, Professor Cook, one of the champions of the 
flexible meaning view, cites with approval for its awareness of the problem In Te 
Jones' Estate (see text accompanying notes 21-33 supra). CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL 
BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 196 n.3 (1942). 
94. See text accompanying notes 21-33 supra. 
95. See text accompanying notes 34-45 supra. 
96. See text accompanying notes 48-54 supa. 
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ceming intestate succession or validity of wills. Without such an 
analysis, manipulation of the meaning of "domicile" is unreasoned 
and blind and, therefore, unwise. With such an analysis, molding 
"domicile" to fit our needs is unnecessary. It is unnecessary because, 
having made the analysis, we can base the result directly upon the 
relevance or irrelevance of the domestic policies in issue and need 
not, therefore should not, speak of "domicile" at all. The time has 
come to bury the albatross. 
